Law Text Culture
Volume 1

Article 16

1994

Not asking the law question
J. Chenoweth

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc

Recommended Citation
Chenoweth, J., Not asking the law question, Law Text Culture, 1, 1994, 153-155.
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol1/iss1/16
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Not asking the law question
Abstract
In Asking the Law Question Margaret Davies launches border raids on the "isolationist mentality" of the
law which mystifies its own specificity and insists on the law's separateness from other forms of
knowledge and practices. Davies' fascination with parameters, borders, boundaries and constraints
manifests itself textually as a constant play of multiple insides and outsides. She confronts the law's
exclusiveness by challenging its systematic exclusions, and she tests the limits of her own inclusion
within the law by dispensing with its traditional distinction between what is appropriate in a legal textbook
and what is not. Davies' border-crossings - her (parenthsized) lighthearted banter, her candid admissions,
her stories, her eclectic sources, her minimal use of cases, her determination not to baffle and not to bore,
her meticulous conceptual unpicking, and her endless questioning - distinguish her text from the legions
of soporific law books which collect dust in law libraries. Here is a volume students might actually put
down before they nod off. This is a pedagogical tour de force, considering Davies is cross-pollinating legal
theory with post-structuralism and deconstruction, all of which are conceptually dense and complex
fields.
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NOT ASKING THE
LAW QUESTION
Joelle Chenoweth
Margaret Davies. Asking The Law Question. Sydney: The Law Book
Company. J994. $42.00
n Asking the Law Question Margaret Davies launches border raids on the
"isolationist mentality" of ~~e law which mystifies its own specificity and
insists on the law's separateness from other fonns of knowledge and practices. Davies' fascination with parameters, borders, boundaries and constraints manifests itself textually as a constant play of multiple insides and
outsides. She confronts the law's exclusiveness by challenging its systematic
exclusions, and she tests the limits of her own inclusion within the law by
dispensing with its traditional distinction between what is appropriate in a
legal textbook and what is not. Davies' border-crossings - her (parenthsized)
lighthearted banter, her candid admissions, her stories, her eclectic sources,
her minimal use of cases, her detennination not to baffle and not to bore, her
meticulous conceptual unpicking, and her endless questioning - distinguish
her text from the legions of soporific law books which collect dust in law
libraries. Here is a volume students might actually put down before they nod
off. This is a pedagogical tour de force, considering Davies is cross-pollinating legal theory with post-structuralism and deconstruction, all of which
are conceptually dense and complex fields.
Davies is intent on bringing down the rhetorical barriers which guarantee
the law's ~'isolationist mentality", and her text bears down on the arbitrariness
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of the law's arsenal ofdistinctions. She targets the law's illusion of its difference: its insistence on the insularity of its discourse, on the objectivity of its
agents, and on the independence of its processes from political and social
contingency. It is a difference which depends on rhetoric for its effects. As
an effect of language this difference is reduced to poetics. It is surprising
then, that when the barriers between law and non-law are dismantled, when
the artificial distinctions are swept aside, that when the law's difference is
deconstructed, the law doesn't simply cease to be useful as a way of talking
about certain things.
She turns her back on the institutional specificity of the law and this has
a radical consequence: it enables her to confer an extraordinary level of generality onto the law. When the barriers are down the law is so like everything
else that it becomes everything else. Who needs the "sign" when the law is
at hand? : "... isn't a law a fonn and a content, a letter and a spirit, a signifier and a signified? Can't we say that concepts are formed by certain laws,
that is, by the processes of drawing a boundary and excluding an outside?
Isn't our conceptual system in fact a legal system ... Isn't what we study as
'law' in law school actually continuous with all sorts of other normative systems in society? In the end, isn't a sign actually a law? Both signs and laws,
in the end, operate as constraints~ boundaries"(240). One might well ask:
"whatever happened to asking the law questionT'
Boundaries were made to be broken. Or should that be laws? As it turns
out, they are one and the same, at least according to Margaret Davies. But
what if it is not the law that is broken, but rather the boundaries which differentiate the law from what it is not? In the first case, it is when the law is
broken that its limit is activated, so in a sense you could never hope to break
the back of the law by simply breaking the law. Rather, it is the reverse. In
the case of breaking the law's boundaries, ceasing to differentiate the law
from what it is not suggests, not that it ceases to exist, but that it risks becoming everything. In Asking the Law Question Davies takes the risk. However,
in Davies' case, this risk does not correspond to a future eventuality, rather it
is a fait acco'mpli, or perhaps one of life's fundamental realities: "Law is an
end because it'imposes constraints - it tells us what to think, how to act, what
to wear, and who to be. . .. Law gives us our identities - we live the law, it
shapes our beings" (275), and surely that process is as old as the world is
young.
What if one considered that the very possibility of describing the law as
everything which lends our life definition is itself not so much the discovery
of a fundamental principle, but rather the effect of a very specific historical
moment. Michel Foucault, a doyen of post-structuralism, calls this moment
the invention of the disciplines. The disciplines are the multitude of constraints which not only give lives meaning, but also shape and administer
individual bodies. They are very like the law, enrolled by it, but still differ154
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entiated from it: "In appearance, [they] constitute nothing more than an
infra-law. They seem to extend the general forms defined by law to the infinitesimal level of individual lives. They seem to constitute the same type of
law on a different scale, thereby making it more meticulous and more indulgent." 1 This differentiation enables Foucault to trace the emergence of a
law-like power and to historicize the apparent ubiquity of the law.
Unfortunately for Davies. her homogenization of constraints (although useful in the pedagogical project she has set for herself) leaves her with an undifferentiated and trans-historical concept of law.
1

Foucault, Michel. 1989 Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison. Trans.

Alan Sheridan. New York: Penguin, p.222.
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